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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING BELOW 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-16 (1987). 
In 1985, the Public Service Commission of Utah (the "Commis-
sion") initiated a generic proceeding involving all providers of 
local exchange telephone service in Utah. The purpose of the pro-
ceeding was to consider the development of a "Lifeline telephone 
service" program for qualified low income households. After 
evidentiary hearings, the proceeding ultimately resulted in the 
adoption of Lifeline Rules (R. 630-635; Addendum 2, Exhibit A) 
and companion Orders of the Commission dated December 17, 1986 
(R. 636-51; Addendum 2, Exhibits B and C) implementing the Rules 
and the Lifeline program effective January 1, 1987. Among numer-
ous other things, the Rules and Orders provide that the reduced 
rates applicable to Lifeline customers are to be funded by a sur-
charge on each access line of participating companies as well as 
a surcharge in long distance rates. The revenues derived from the 
surcharges are pooled by all participating companies. This appeal 
relates to the requirement of pooling under the Rules and Orders. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Does the Commission lack the statutory authority to re-
quire a Lifeline pooling mechanism, the effect of which is to 
require non-Lifeline customers of Mountain Bell to subsidize in 
part the Lifeline customers of other telephone companies? 
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2. Was the action of the Commission to require a Lifeline 
pooling arrangement an appropriate exercise of its ratemaking 
power? 
3. Is the pooling arrangement an illegal tax imposed by a 
regulatory agency that lacks the power to tax? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann, § 54-4-12 (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a petition for review of the Lifeline Rules and 
Orders of the Commission issued in Case No. 85-999-13. In this 
case, the Commission adopted Rules and issued Orders requiring 
local exchange carriers who provide Lifeline service to pool 
revenues and costs associated with the provision of Lifeline 
service. In this petition for review, Mountain Bell asks the 
Court to set aside those portions of the Lifeline Rules and 
Orders requiring the pooling arrangement. 
B. Course of Proceedings Before the Commission. 
On June 20, 1985, the Commission initiated this case as a 
generic proceeding to address numerous issues relating to the 
establishment, administration and funding of a discounted local 
exchange service (commonly known as "Lifeline" service) for low 
income telephone subscribers (R. 337-38). The Commission raised 
nineteen issues it desired the parties to address, including 
whether the Commission has the power to establish Lifeline ser-
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vice, how the revenue shortfall should be met, and whether sur-
charge revenues should be pooled (R. 349-51). After several par-
ties, including Mountain Bell, filed Briefs supporting the Com-
mission's ability to order a Lifeline service (R. 359-91), the 
Commission issued a Declaratory Order on January 3, 1986 conclud-
ing that "it has the authority to establish a lower rate to pro-
vide 'lifeline' service to a distinct group of ratepayers." (R. 
472) . 
Hearings were held in February 1986 dealing with a variety of 
issues, such as who should receive Lifeline service, how they 
would be qualified, how the lower rates would be funded, what 
services would be discounted, etc. After issuing two versions of 
proposed Rules (R. 515-19, 555-60) and receiving comments from 
the parties (R. 520-47, 567-76, 585-95), the Commission adopted 
Lifeline Rules on December 1, 1986 (R. 630-35). The Rules are 
attached as Exhibit A to Addendum II. On December 17, 1986, the 
Commission issued two companion Orders in Case No. 85-999-13. 
The first Order (attached hereto as Exhibit B to Addendum II) 
established procedures for implementing the Lifeline program, 
established the surcharges, and ordered local exchange carriers 
to file Lifeline tariffs (R. 636-42). In the second Order 
(attached hereto as Exhibit C to Addendum II) the Commission made 
findings of fact as to its rationale for adopting a Lifeline pro-
gram, affirmed the effectiveness of the Lifeline Rules and 
ordered the program to become effective on January 1, 1987 (R. 
643-51). On December 22, 1986 Mountain Bell filed an Application 
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for Review or Rehearing of those portions of the Rules requiring 
a pooling arrangement (R. 659-62). The Commission denied the 
application on January 12, 1987 (R. 673-75; Addendum II, Exhibit 
D). On January 6, 1987 Mountain Bell filed an Application for 
Review and Rehearing of the companion Orders of December 17, 1986 
(R. 664-66). The Commission denied the application on February 
4, 1987 (R. 684-87; Addendum II, Exhibit E). The Petition for 
Review was filed on February 11, 1987 (R. 694). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Lifeline Program. An understanding of Mountain 
Bell's appeal requires a general explanation of the Lifeline pro-
gram adopted by the Commission. 
Paragraph 1(1) of the Lifeline Rules requires any local ex-
change carrier whose basic local exchange rates exceed $9.45 per 
month to establish Lifeline telephone service (R.630). The Rules 
define as an eligible party to receive Lifeline service any per-
son who is currently eligible for any one of eight state assis-
tance programs (_Id*)# and defines how such persons shall apply 
for the program (R. 631). line Rules set forth procedures for 
verifying eligibility (R. 631-32). Section IV of the Rules 
states that Lifeline customers shall pay $9.45 for basic tele-
phone service (R. 632). Thus, the Lifeline discount for local 
exchange service is the difference between $9.45 and the basic 
rate for service (which in Mountain Bell's case is $13.13, for a 
discount of $3.78 per month). Once a state commission approves a 
Lifeline rate, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) waives 
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an FCC charge of $2.00 per month (R. 682-83). Thus, the total 
Lifeline discount for Mountain Bell Lifeline customers is $5.78 
per month. Lifeline service is thus discounted local exchange 
service available for qualified low income subscribers. Lifeline 
customers also receive a 50 percent discount on the connection 
fees applicable to connecting local exchange service. Mountain 
Bell does not object to any of the foregoing provisions of the 
Rule. Indeed, Mountain Bell supports them as being completely 
reasonable. 
B. Lifeline Funding. The sole reason for Mountain Bell's 
appeal is its objection to the mechanism used to fund Lifeline 
service. Section VI of the Rule provides that 80 percent of the 
cost of funding Lifeline service is to come from a surcharge on 
the local exchange service^ of non-Lifeline customers of compa-
nies offering Lifeline service. The additional 20 percent is to 
be funded by a surcharge on "all intrastate toll and access 
services in the State of Utah."2 Section VI(3) creates a pool 
into which the revenues from the surcharges flow. The Commission 
is designated to be the pool administrator. One of its duties is 
to distribute "to each local exchange carrier offering lifeline 
telephone service a share of such pool so as to equalize state-
1. This charge applies to all basic residence and business 
lines. For example, the typical residence customer who has 
only one line pays one surcharge per month. Customers with 
more than one line pay a surcharge on each line. 
2. This surcharge is assessed on a per minute of use basis on 
long distance calls billed by local carriers and on intra-
state access services used by alternate toll providers. 
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wide the amount of the local service surcharge paid by customers 
of such carriers to fund lifeline telephone service." 
(§ VI.(3)(c), R. 634; emphasis added). Thus, the local surcharge 
is not calculated on a company by company basis; rather, the sur-
charge is calculated as though the companies supplying Lifeline 
service were one company rather than several different entities. 
It is this pooling arrangement to which Mountain Bell objects. 
C. The Effect of Pooling. The effect of pooling was clear-
ly described during the hearings. The second largest local ex-
change company in Utah is Continental Telephone Company (Contel). 
The evidence showed that Mountain Bell has approxxmately 468,000 
residence lines while Contel has about 10,000 (R.62). It was 
estimated that there were 37,610 potential Lifeline customers in 
Mountain Bell, or approximately 8 percent of its total customers 
(R. 62-63, 199). For Contel, however, the estimated potential 
Lifeline customers were 2028 or approximately 20 percent of the 
total (R. 62-63, 199). On that basis, Contel's witness, Mr. 
Theodore Carrier, took the position that Lifeline should be fun-
ded on a pooled basis and not on a company specific basis since, 
in his view, Lifeline is a '"social program for the benefit of 
society." (R. 183). Mr. Carrier acknowledged that under a pool-
ing arrangement Mountain Bell's non-Lifeline customers would be 
paying more in Lifeline surcharges than they would if they were 
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funding only Mountain Bell's lifeline customers.3 The obvious 
effect of pooling is that non-Lifeline customers of companies 
like Mountain Bell must pay higher surcharges and that non-
3. The following interchange occurred between counsel for 
Mountain Bell and Mr. Carrier: 
Q. Let's discuss pooling for just a minute. Based on the 
revised numbers that you gave us in your summary you 
are asserting at this point that based on the numbers 
available to you that — and based on some of the Divi-
sion' s numbers at approximately 20% of Continental's 
residential customers would qualify for lifeline and 
8.4% of Mountain Bell's would qualify. 
A. Correct. 
Q. Would you agree — maybe I can phrase this hypothetical-
ly. Would you agree that if indeed those numbers are 
correct, and also assume that the amount of any life-
line discount that would be applied in Continental ver-
sus Mountain Bell would be roughly the same, that in 
that kind of an instance that Mountain Bell ratepayers 
would be paying more under a pooling arrangement than 
they would if they were merely being asked to fund life-
line within Mountain Bell? 
A. Oh, no doubt about it; however, ConTel customers would 
be paying substantially greater than Mountain Bell non-
lifeline customers to fund a social service program. 
Q. In other words, you're saying that if we kept them sepa-
rate ConTel would be paying more than Mountain Bell? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. I think I understand your argument. I just wanted to 
make sure the record is clear that under the proposal 
that you're making and with the numbers that you have 
given here that your proposal would cause Mountain Bell 
customers to pay more than they otherwise would if they 
were merely supporting lifeline for other Mountain Bell 
customers. 
A. That's correct. (R. 199-20). (Emphasis added). 
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Lifeline customers in companies like Contel pay less. Thus, Con-
tel Lifeline customers are subsidized in part by customers of a 
completely different company• 
Dc Mountain Bell Objected Repeatedly to Pooling. During 
the evidentiary hearings and at later points in the proceeding 
Mountain Bell objected to a pooling arrangement. 
Mr. Orville Unruh, Mountain Bell's witness, testified that 
Mountain Bell opposed pooling and indicated that it was improper 
to move the burden of Lifeline funding from one company's cus-
tomers ' to another company's customers (R. 150, 164-65). He in-
dicated that welfare type programs are "beyond the capability of 
private corporations." (R. 166). He also pointed out he did not 
believe "one company can afford to subsidize another company as 
we move into a competitive environment." (R. 168)• 
Later, in response to proposed rules that required pooling, 
Mountain Bell filed comments claiming that pooling was both inap-
propriate and beyond the power of the Commission (R. 529-33; 
589-90). 
In its orders denying rehearing, the Commission implied that 
the stipulation entered by Mountain Bell and other parties which 
established working procedures for the Lifeline program was some-
how an agreement "that all parties to the Stipulation were in 
agreement that pooling was the only presently workable mechanism 
to fund the Lifeline program." (R. 674, 685). Mountain Bell's 
entry into the Stipulation was not in any manner a concession 
that pooling was either approporiate or legal. At the time of the 
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Stipulation, the Commission had made it clear that it intended to 
adopt Rules requiring pooling and that it wanted the Lifeline 
program to begin on January 1, 1987. Given those facts, the Stip-
ulation was an attempt on Mountain Bell's part to cooperate with 
the Commission and other parties to develop workable procedures. 
It was not a waiver of the position Mountain Bell had taken with 
regard to pooling. In fact, Mountain Bell refused to enter the 
Stipulation until the insertion of paragraph 9, which states: 
9. This Stipulation reflects agreement by all parties as to 
the procedures to administer the lifeline telephone service 
program as well as the initial lifeline telephone service 
surcharge rates. It does not in any way limit the right of 
any party to exercise all legal rights available to them, 
including the right to seek rehearing or review of the Com-
mission' s Rule or the Order ultimately adopted by the Commis-
sion or to appeal such Rule or Order if they so choose. 
(R. 622). Thus, while Mountain Bell agreed to procedures to make 
a pooling procedure operate efficiently, it did not waive its 
right to seek review or appeal of the Rules or Orders. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The Lifeline pooling arrangement was beyond the statu-
tory power of the Commission. The Commission's power must come 
from statutes that expressly grant the power or which clearly 
imply the existence of the power. Neither Section 54-4-5 and 54-
4-7 (the provisions cited by the Commission) nor any other statu-
tory provision grants such a power to the Commission. The fact 
that the legislature expressly granted the Commission the power 
to require pooling in another context but was silent with regard 
to such a power in the Lifeline context demonstrates the lack of 
authority in this context. Under the principle of construction 
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"expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the expression of one 
thing is the exclusion of another), the Commission lacks the 
power to require pooling• 
2. The Commission possesses the power to implement a Life-
line program under its ratemaking power. However, that ratemak-
ing power does not extend to allowing the Commission to order the 
customers of one company to pay rates that subsidize the rates of 
customers in a separate company. 
3. The Commission does not have the power to tax. In 
requiring the customers of one company to pay rates that, in 
part, subsidize discounted local exchange service for customers 
in other companies, the Commission has illegally imposed a tax. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE BASIC ISSUE IN THIS APPEAL IS WHETHER THE COMMIS-
SION EXCEEDED ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY IN REQUIRING A POOLING AR-
RANGEMENT, THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW ACCORDS NO DEFERENCE TO 
THE COMMISSION. 
The correct scope of judicial review of Commission orders was 
comprehensively explained in Utah Department of Administrative 
Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) 
("Wexpro II"). In this appeal, the basic issue is whether the 
Commission went beyond its statutory authority in ordering a 
pooling arrangement. The Wexpro II decision defined the standard 
of review in such a case as follows: 
In reviewing the Commission's interpretations of general 
questions of law, this Court applies a correction-of-error 
standard, with no deference to the expertise of the Commis-
sion. 
Examples of this correction-of-error type of review include 
whether the Commission has complied with fairness require-
ments of due process, whether the Commission has acted beyond 
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its statutory jurisdiction or authority, and such questions 
of general law as the interpretation of contracts and cer-
tificates. (Footnotes omitted; emphasis added). 
Id. at 608. Thus, since the question in the appeal is whether 
the Commission acted beyond its statutory jurisdiction or author-
ity, the correction of error standard applies. 
II. THE COMMISSION LACKS THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REQUIRE A 
"POOLING" ARRANGEMENT AS PART OF THE LIFELINE FUNDING MECHANISM. 
The central legal issue in this appeal is whether the Commis-
sion has the legal authority to mandate a pooling arrangement as 
the means to fund Lifeline telephone service. A careful analysis 
of the law makes it clear that the Commission does not possess 
that power. 
A. Although Vested With Broad Power to Regulate Public Util-
ities, the Commission's Power Must Derive from Specific Statutes. 
A line of recent Utah Supreme Court cases establishes clearly 
that the jurisdiction over utilities granted in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-4-1^ is not so broad as to empower the Commission to do any-
thing it believes is in the public interest. In Interwest Corp. 
v. Public Service Commission, 510 P.2d 919 (Utah 1973), a regu-
lated water company refused to supply a new customer in its 
service area with all of the water requested because, although it 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-1 (1986): 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction 
to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state, 
and to supervise all of the business of every such public 
utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein 
specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are 
necessary or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction. . . . 
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currently had sufficient supplies to do so, it had previously 
committed some of its excess to a prior user's planned future 
requirements. Attempting to protect the public interest, the 
Commission ordered that the utility need not supply all of the 
needs of the new customer because numerous members of the public 
had acted in reliance on the plans of the prior customer to have 
water available for them when they needed it. The Court reversed 
the Commission, holding: 
The Public Service Commission was created by the legislature 
and charged with the gen€»ral duties of regulating public 
utilities. The Commission can only exercise those powers 
granted by the legislature"! We find no statute, nor has our 
attention been called to any statute, which authorizes the 
Commission to set up a system of priorities or allocations" 
for the use of water on aTerritorial basis as> was done in 
this case. 
510 P.2d at 920 (emphasis added). Thus, the Commission may not 
adopt any power it deems useful in the public interest, but is 
limited to those powers granted by the Legislature. 
In Basin Flying Service v. Public Service Commission, 5 31 
P.2d 1303 (Utah 1975), the Court reaffirmed the principle that 
the Commission's power of regulation is a delegation of legisla-
tive authority and that "restraints or duties imposed by law must 
be clear and unequivocal." Id. at 1305. The Court also stated: 
In harmony with this it is well established that a regulatory 
body such as the Public Service Commission, which is created 
by ?ri derives its powers and duties from statute, has no 
inherent regulatory powers, but only those which are express-
ly granted, or which are clearly implied as necessary to the 
discharge of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it. 
Id. (Footnote omitted; emphasis added). 
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In Kearns-Tribune Corp* v. Public Service Commission, 682 
P.2d 858 (Utah 1984), the Commission, relying on Section 54-4-1 
as authority, required Mountain Fuel to include a tagline^ on 
certain of its advertising. The Supreme Court expressly rejected 
such a broad reading of Section 54-4-1: 
In a ruling on a similar tagline requirement, the Oregon 
Court of Appeals held that the tagline requirement was not 
within the authority delegated to the Public Utility Commis-
sioner of Oregon. This holding was grounded on the absence 
of a "clearly defined statutory grant of authority" for the 
enactment of the tagline rule. The relevant Oregon statutes 
included broad language similar to Utah's § 54-4-1, on which 
the PSC relies in this case. . . . 
Despite the broad language of the Oregon statute, and further 
expansive language giving the Commissioner the authority to 
"adopt and amend reasonable and proper rules and regulations 
relative to all statutes administered by him," the Oregon 
court was unable to find a clearly defined statutory grant of 
authority authorizing the imposition of a tagline because the 
statutory scheme nowhere mentioned the authority to regulate 
advertising as a discrete function. We are similarly unable 
to find any clearly defined statutory grant to the PSC to 
regulate utility advertising. 
Id. at 859-60 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The 
Court also noted that "the PSC has no broad statutory authority 
to 'serve the public interest,'" but is limited to practices 
"'necessary and convenient' in the exercise of [its] regulation 
of rates." I^ci. at 861 n. 1. Kearns-Tribune clearly shows that 
Section 54-4-1 does not invest the Commission with unbridled 
discretion. 
5. Tagline, as used in Kearns-Tribune, refers to a statement 
required to be included with certain advertisements indicat-
ing that the cost of the advertisement would not be claimed 
as an operating expense in ratemaking. 
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Even in the context of ratemaking, an area of regulation in 
which the Commission clearly has significant power, the Court has 
held that Section 54-4-1 does not mean the Commission can do any-
thing it chooses. For example, in Utah Department of Business 
Regulation v. Public Service Co, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986), the 
Commission relied on Section 54-4-1 for authority to authorize 
Utah Power & Light to make an accounting adjustment by trans-
ferring funds from an "energy balancing account" to a general 
revenue account to make up for revenue shortfalls in the general 
revenue account. The Court held that the Commission had exceeded 
its statutory authority. Id. at 423. 
B. No Specific Statute Gives the Commission the Power to 
Require Pooling of the Funding of Lifeline Service. 
In its orders denying rehearing, the Commission claimed that 
the authority to require a mandatory pooling arrangement exists 
under Sections 54-4-5 and 54-4-7 of Utah Code Annotated (R. 674, 
685-86). Neither of these statutes grant such a power to the 
Commission. 
The applicable portion of section 54-4-5 states: 
Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing, that the 
rates, fares or charges in force over the lines of two or 
more common carriers between any two points in this state are 
unjust, unreasonable or excessive, or that no satisfactory 
through route or joint rate fare or charge exists between 
such points, or that public convenience and necessity demand 
the establishment of a through route and joint rate, fare or 
charge between such points, the commission shall order such 
common carriers to establish such through route, and may 
establish and fix a joint rate, fare or charge which will be 
fair, just, reasonable and sufficient to be allowed, charged, 
enforced, demanded and collected in the future, and the terms 
and conditions under which such through route shall be oper-
ated. (Emphasis added). 
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In its orders denying rehearing, the Commission focused on the 
term "joint rate11 and concluded without further analysis that 
such language gave it the authority to require a pooling arrange-
ment. In so doing, the Commission ignored the language limiting 
the application of Section 54-4-5 to "common carriers" and failed 
to recognize that the telephone utilities are not "common car-
riers" under Utah law. Section 54-2-1(8) defines common carriers 
as follows: 
(8) "Common carrier" includes every: 
(a) railroad corporation; 
(b) street railroad corporation; 
(c) automobile corporation; 
(d) scheduled aircraft carrier corporation; 
(e) aerial bucket tramway corporation; 
(f) express corporation; 
(g) dispatch, sleeping, dining, drawing-room, freight, 
refrigerator, oil, stock, and fruit car corporation; 
(h) freight line, car-loaning, car-renting, 
car-loading, and every other car corporation, and person; 
(i) their lessees, trustees, and receivers, operating 
for public service within this state; and 
(j) every corporation and person, their lessees, 
trustees, and receivers, engaged in the transportation of 
persons or property for public service over regular routes 
between points within this state. 
Obviously, since Section 54-4-5 applies only to common carriers, 
and since neither Mountain Bell nor any other telephone utility 
subject to the Lifeline Rule falls within that definition, the 
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Commission's reliance upon Section 54-4-5 is totally misplaced.6 
The Commission's reliance on Section 54-4-7 is equally mis-
placed. That section states: 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that the 
rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facili-
ties, or service of any public utility, or the methods of 
manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or supply 
employed by it, are unjust, unreasonable, unscife, improper, 
inadequate or insufficient, the Commission shall determine 
the just, reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient 
rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facili-
ties, service or methods to be observed, furnished, con-
structed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same by its 
order, rule or regulation. The commission, after a hearing, 
shall prescribe rules and regulations for the performance of 
any service or the furnishing of any commodity of the charac-
ter furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on prop-
er demand and tender of rates such public utility shall fur-
nish such commodity or render such service within the time 
and upon the conditions provided in such rules. 
(Emphasis added). The Commission quoted the underlined portions 
in support of its conclusion that it possessed the power to re-
quire pooling. Apparently the Commission has concluded that the 
general language empowering it to order utilities to 
Even if telephone utilities fell under Section 54-4-5, it 
does not give the Commission the authority to require pool-
ing. When the statute uses the terms "joint rate" it is 
referring to rates applicable when "two or more common car-
riers" are "jointly" providing a service. A pooling arrange-
ment and a joint rate are not synonymous. Rather, a joint 
rate and the authority to apportion a joint rate between two 
separate utilities deals with the situation where multiple 
companies are providing a singular service. By contrast, 
Lifeline service is not a joint service of multiple pro-
viders . It is nothing more than a discounted local exchange 
service for certain qualified low income households. 
Mountain Bell provides Lifeline service solely to its own 
customers. In the telephone industry it is the furthest 
thing from a jointly provided service. 
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"render . . . service within the time and upon the conditions 
provided in such rules'1 is sufficient to allow it to order a 
pooling arrangement by which the customers of one company subsi-
dize the customers of an entirely different company. Such a con-
clusion is unwarranted• 
The statute is a general provision giving the Commission the 
power to assure that such things as a utility's equipment and 
facilities are appropriate or that its methods of manufacture or 
supply are proper. It is obviously referring to the physical 
activities of providing a utility service or commodity, such as 
having regulatory oversight over unsafe facilities or equipment. 
Indeed, the only case that has construed this section dealt with 
whether the loading facilities of a railroad were safe. Union 
Pacific Railroad v. Public Service Commission, 211 P.2d 851 (Utah 
1949) . 
Also, the statute refers to public utility in the singular. 
Nothing in its language purports to allow the Commission, as it 
has done in the Lifeline Rules, to require one utility's cus-
tomers to fund the services of the customers of another utility. 
It takes a massive leap of logic to construe the vague and 
obviously inapplicable language of Section 54-4-7 to support a 
pooling mechanism. Section 54-4-7 manifestly grants no explicit 
authority to support the Commission's action. There is nothing 
in the context of the provision that could implicitly grant such 
power to the Commission. It thus fails the tests of Interwest, 
Basin Flying Service, and Kearns-Tribune cases. These cases 
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create a rule of strict construction of the Commission's powers. 
Like the Wyoming Supreme court in Public Service Commission v. 
Formal Complaint of WWZ Co., 641 P.2d 183 (Wyo. 1982), this Court 
has held that unless clearly granted a power by statute, the Com-
mission lacks the authority to act. In the WWZ Co. case, the 
Wyoming Court overturned a lower court ruling that the Wyoming 
Public Service Commission had jurisdiction over a sewage disposal 
company. The Court, in rejecting what it characterized as the 
lower court's "expansive definitions of words," stated: 
[T]he statutes creating and empowering the Public Service 
Commission must be strictly construed and any reasonable 
doubt of the existence of any power must be resolved against 
the exercise thereof. 
Id. at 186. Given the total lack of credible statutory author-
ity, the Court should likewise find that no power exists to order 
a pooling arrangement. 
In another context, the Commission itself has adhered to a 
narrow construction of its powers and jurisdiction. In a 1983 
proceeding in which the Commission decided that one-way paging 
was not a public utility service, the Commission grappled with 
the question whether an expansive interpretation of the statutory 
language was appropriate. The Commission stated: 
[l]f in defining "telephone line" one focuses on the 
phrase "facilitate telephone communication," the scope 
of potentially regulated servic - becomes staggering. 
Conceivably the Commission should then regulate all sup-
pliers of telephone equipment, e.g., Radio Shack, Sears, 
J.C. Penney, Panasonic, suppliers of wiring components; 
all suppliers of telephone directories, including the 
many not affiliated with the Bell System; telephone an-
swering services, telephone answering devices and all 
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such suppliers; radio talk stations; newspaper clas-
sified advertising, ax3 absurdum. The focus instead 
should be on the connotation of telephone service which 
implies interactive, and at least potentially extended""" 
two-way communication* That was certainly the focus in 
1917 when the statute was enacted. (Emphasis added). 
Application of Page America, Order on Motion for Exempt Certifi-
cate at 11 (Case No. 83-082-01, Utah PSC, Nov. 28, 1983), rev'd 
on other grounds, Williams v. Public Service Commission, 720 P.2d 
773 (Utah 1986). In the Page America case there was statutory 
language upon which the Commission could have found jurisdiction, 
yet the Commission chose not to do so. In this case, the statu-
tory language does not even exist. 
c#
 A Rule of Statutory Construction Adopted by the Utah 
Supreme Court Demonstrates that the Commission Lacks the Power to 
Require Pooling. 
There is one situation in which the Commission does have the 
power to order a pooling arrangement between telephone utilities 
— the situation where two or more companies provide joint 
services. Section 54-4-12 defines the situation this way: 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that a 
physical connection can reasonably be made between the lines 
of two or more telephone corporations, or two or more tele-
graph corporations, whose lines can be made to form a con-
tinuous line of communication by the construction and main-
tenance of suitable connections for the transfer of messages 
or conversation, and that public convenience and necessity 
will be subserved thereby, or shall find that two or more 
telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to establish 
joint rates, tolls or charges for service by or over their 
said lines and that joint rates, tolls or charges ought to be 
established, the commission may, by its order, require that 
such connection be made, except where the purpose of such 
connection is primarily to secure the transmission of local 
messages or conversations between points within the same city 
or town, and that conversations be transmitted and messages 
transferred over such connections under such rules and reg-
ulations as the commission may establish and prescribe, and 
that through lines and joint rates, tolls and charges be made 
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and be used, observed and be in force in the future. If such 
telephone or telegraph corporations do not agree upon the 
division between themselves of the cost of such physical con-
nection or connections, or upon the division of the joint" 
rates, toll or charges established by the commission over 
¥uch through lines, the ""commission shall have authority, 
after a further hearing, to establish such division by 
supplemental order. 
(Emphasis added). Thus, if two telephone companies refuse to 
interconnect to provide long distance service, the Commission has 
the power to order them to do so. More importantly, if two com-
panies providing joint service "do not agree between themselves 
upon the division of joint rates . . . the Commission shall have 
the power to . . . fix the division of such joint rates." There-
fore, in the absence of agreement, the Commission would have the 
power to order a joint rate scheme for the division of intrastate 
toll costs and revenues — such a scheme can take the form of a 
pooling arrangement — if the Commission finds it to be the ap-
propriate means of effecting the division of the costs and 
revenues of the joint service. Traditionally, telephone compa-
nies have entered into pooling arrangements for the division of 
costs and revenues for intrasate long distance services that they 
are jointly providing. See, e.g., Lemhi Telephone Co. v. 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 571 P.2d 753 (Idaho 
1977). However, Section 54-4-12 does not apply to Lifeline 
service since it is not a jointly provided service. To be a 
jointly provided service, there must be a physical connection 
between the two companies relating to the provision of such 
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service.7 Obviously, no physical interconnection is involved in 
the provision of Lifeline service since Lifeline exists indepen-
dent of any inter-connection with another telephone company. 
Thus, since the Legislature granted the Commission the power 
to require pooling where joint services are provided by two or 
more companies, the lack of similar explicit authority to require 
pooling when the service is not jointly provided, as in the case 
of Lifeline service, means that the Commission does not possess 
the power in that context. 
The principle of statutory construction known as "expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius" is the law in Utah. See Hansen v. 
Wilkinson, 658 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1983); Cannon v. Gardner, 
611 P. 2d 1207, 1209 (Utah 1980); and Olympia Sales Co. v. Long, 
604 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1979). It means that the "expression of 
one thing is the exclusion of another." Black's Law Dictionary 
692 (4th Rev. Ed. 1968). See also Allstate Insurance Co. v. Wyo-
ming Insurance Dept., 672 P.2d 810, 817 (Wyo. 1983). This prin-
ciple is clearly laid out in the Cannon case. There the Salt 
Lake County Attorney commenced an action against a candidate who 
7. In a recent Order, the Commission concluded that a physical 
connection is an absolute prerequisite to a requirement that 
the companies establish joint rates or continue toll pooling 
agreements. In re Navajo Communications Co., Report and 
Order at 4-5 (consolidated Case Nos. 85-049-06 and 85-050-01, 
Utah PSC, February 25, 1986) (A copy of the Order is attached 
hereto as Addendum 2, Exhibit F). In that case the Commis-
sion concluded that Mountain Bell had no continuing duty to 
pool long distance revenues with Navajo since, at divesti-
ture, the physical connection between them terminated. 
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had been elected county surveyor, attempting to enjoin him from 
taking office on the ground that he lacked professional registra-
tion as a land surveyor. The district court enjoined the candi-
date from assuming office. On appeal, this Court vacated the 
injunction, holding that the Legislature had not intended that 
county surveyors be required to hold professional credentials. 
This conclusion was based on the fact that a separate statute 
required a county attorney to be professionally licensed while 
there was no similar statute placing the same requirement upon 
the surveyor. The Court, referring to the statute requiring the 
county attorney to be professionally qualified, stated: 
That enactment providing for professional qualifications for 
the county attorney is significant. It shows that the legis-
lature does not leave the professional requirement to be im-
plied. . . . [W]hen it intends that county officials . . . 
must have specific qualifications and be licensed it express-
ly so provides. . . . The maxim "expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius" is applicable. 
Id. at 1209. Likewise, the fact that the Legislature chose to 
grant the Commission the powrer to require pooling in one context 
(jointly provided services such as long distance) and was silent 
as to that power in a different context, compels the conclusion 
that the power does not exist in the other context. The Commis-
sion thus lacks the power to require pooling in the Lifeline 
context. 
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III. THE COMMISSION'S POWER TO DEVELOP A LIFELINE RATE MUST 
DERIVE FROM ITS RATEMAKING AUTHORITY. A POOLING ARRANGEMENT FOR 
LIFELINE SERVICE IS NOT PROPER RATEMAKING. 
A. The Commission's Power to Order a Lifeline Rate is 
Derived from its Ratemaking Power. 
While there are numerous decisions from other jurisdictions 
dealing with lifeline rates, the question of the Utah Commis-
sion's authority is defined in Mountain States Legal Foundation 
v. Utah Public Service Commission., 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981)• 
In that case, a Utah Power & Light (UP&L) rate case, the Commis-
sion allocated a portion of the overall increase to residential 
customers, with the exception of residences where heads of house-
holds were over 65 years of age. The reduced revenues resulting 
from that action were to be made up from the remaining body of 
UP&L residential customers. The reason for the reduced rate for 
the benefitted group were that (1) as a group they have annual 
incomes less than other family group categories and (2) as a 
group they consume less energy per household than residential 
units as a whole. 
The Court's opinion articulates several important principles. 
First, although deference is to be given the Commission orders 
relating to the reasonableness of rates and rate structures, "if 
the Commission has not acted within the powers delegated to it by 
the Legislature . . . an order is contrary to law and must be set 
aside." 16_. at 1051. Second, orders of the Commission must be 
based on clear factual findings that demonstrate a rational basis 
for its conclusions. Third, the power of the Commission to 
"classify" customers — in the Lifeline context, to determine who 
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will and will not be able to qualify for the reduced rate — 
flows from the Commission's ratemaking power. The Court stated: 
We begin with the general proposition that the power to 
classify customers according to common characteristics is 
essential to rational ratemaking. Appropriate classification 
of customers, if for no other reason, is necessary to maxi-
mize the efficient utilization of plant and equipment and 
thereby provide the lowest possible rates on an equitable 
basis . . . . 
Classification of customers must necessarily be accomplished 
by reference to general characteristics having some rational 
nexus with the criteria used for determining just and reason-
able rates. 
Id. at 1052-53. It is thus clear that the power of the Commis-
sion to develop a lifeline rate and provide for its funding is 
only in the context of its ratemaking authority and not from some 
generalized perception that it can do whatever it perceives to be 
in the public interest.8 
B. Requiring Mountain Bell to Participate in a Pooling Arrange-
ment is Not a Proper Exercise of the Commission's Ratemaking 
Authority. 
While invalidating the lifeline electric rate approved by the 
Commission, the Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation made it 
clear that such a rate structure could be legal pursuant to the 
Commission's ratemaking power if based on adequate factual find-
ings. Such a conclusion is not in any sense a validation of a 
pooling scheme among several utilities to fund a lifeline pro-
gram. The program considered by the Court in Mountain States 
8. In Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 682 
P.2d 858, 861 n.l (Utah 1984) this Court concluded that "the 
PSC has no broad authority to 'serve the public interest.'" 
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Legal Foundation was, from a funding perspective, structured in 
the way Mountain Bell contends is appropriate. Those UP&L cus-
tomers who did not qualify for lifeline were to be the funding 
source for the lower lifeline rates of UP&L lifeline customers. 
The customers of other electric companies were not required to 
fund UP&L's lifeline program. UP&L ratepayers were not required 
to fund lower rates of lifeline customers in other companies. 
Nothing in the Mountain States Legal Foundation decision vali-
dates the pooling arrangement as an appropriate funding 
mechanism. 
Indeed, the fact that the power to institute a lifeline pro-
gram comes only from the Commission ratemaking power compels the 
conclusion that pooling is utterly inconsistent with that power. 
The Commission does not regulate rates by industry; it regulates 
the rates of individual companies. As a consequence, its power 
to regulate rates applies only to individual companies. The lan-
guage of the basic statute authorizing rate regulation — Section 
54-4-4 — is phrased in terms of the power of the Commission to 
regulate the rates of "any public utility". Nowhere is there 
language authorizing the Commission to regulate jointly the rates 
of more than one utility, except where they are jointly providing 
a single service. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-12. The cases that have 
addressed the Commission's ratemaking power have all proceeded 
from the underlying premise that the power extends to rates of 
individual companies and not groups of companies. A recent exam-
ple is Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
- 25 -
Commission, 720 P.2d 420 (Utah 1986). In describing the ratemak-
ing process, the Court stated: 
Some background discussion concerning utility rate making is 
necessary to a consideration of the issues presented. Fol-
lowing lengthy hearings, utility rates are fixed prospective-
ly by the PSC . . . . In determining an appropriate rate, 
the PSC considers the utility's historical income and cost 
data, as well as predictions of future costs and revenues, 
and arrives at a rate which is projected as being adequate to 
cover costs and give the utility's shareholders a fair return 
on equity. (citations omitted). 
Obviously, this Court considers ratemaking to be ci company-
specific proposition. 
Cases from other jurisdictions support this concept, even 
when dealing with operationally independent divisions of a single 
company. A recent Maine decision illustrates this principle. 
Maine Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission., 482 A.2d 443 
(Me. 1984), involved a water company with five separate divi-
sions, each of which was "physically and operationally indepen-
dent" and whose "costs are readily identifiable." Id. at 456. 
In a rate proceeding, the Maine Utilities Commission increased 
the rates of four of the divisions, but refused to raise the 
rates for the fifth division, even though the current rate levels 
in that division were below the cost of providing the service. 
As a matter of "rate design," the Commission decided to shift the 
burden of the shortfall to the ratepayers in the other four divi-
sions, ^d. at 455. The Maine Supreme Court concluded, as a 
matter of law, that the Commission had exceeded its power, hold-
ing that it was inappropriate to burden the ratepayers of the 
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other four divisions with the revenue shortfall in the other 
division. jCd. at 456.9 
The Utah Commission's decision to require pooling is even 
more tenuous than the Maine Commission's action in the Maine 
Water case. In the Maine Water case, the Commission was at least 
dealing with a single company. In the present case, the 
Commission is dealing with completely separate corporate enti-
ties, each of which serves separate customers in separate parts 
of the state. The Commission's action is an unprecedented and 
highly questionable regulatory policy decision that goes far 
beyond the reasonable limits of its power to regulate rates of an 
individual utility. 
IV. THE POOLING ARRANGEMENT IS A TAX WHICH THE COMMISSION CANNOT 
LEGALLY LEVY. 
Under Utah law, it is undisputed that the taxing power held 
by the Legislature cannot be delegated to any other party, in-
cluding an administrative agency. This principle was established 
-*-
n
 Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 48 
P.2d 526 (Utah 1935). In that case, the issue was whether the 
State Tax Commission had properly assessed sales tax on certain 
9. The idea that separate companies and separate divisions 
should pay their own way dates as far back as 1898 when the 
Supreme Court held that rates for one rail service could not 
be justified by the rates from another rail service. See 
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 46, 18 S.Ct. 418, 42 L.Ed. 819 
(1898). In El Paso Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, 667 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1982), the court referred 
to this principle as the "stand alone11 concept and stressed 
that "its purpose is to avoid cross-subsidization." Id. at 
468. 
- 27 -
sales made by a leather supplier. On appeal, the Tax Commission 
argued that "in doubtful cases the ruling of the State Tax Com-
mission, in determining whose duty it is to pay the sales tax, 
should not be interferred with by the courts." .Id. at 527. In 
rejecting that argument and in overturning the Tax Commission's 
assessment, the Court stated: 
The power vested in the commission to prescribe rules and 
regulations for making returns for ascertaining assessment 
and collection of the tax imposed by the act does not vest in 
the commission any discretion whatsoever in the matter 
requiring the payment of a sales tax by any one other than 
such as are designated in the act. It is true that an ad-
ministrative body within prescribed limits, and when au-
thorized by the lawmaking power, may make rules and regula-
tions calculated to carry into effect the expressed legisla-
tive intention. Under our State Constitution the legislative 
power of the state shall be vested: 
"L In a Senate and House of Representatves which shall 
be designated the Legislature of the State of Utah. 
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as hereinafter 
stated." Constitution of Utah, art. 6, § 1. 
The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to 
others the essential legislative function with which it is~" 
thus vested. The imposition of a tax and the" designation "of 
those who must pay the same is such an essential legislative 
function as may not be transferred to others « (emphasis 
added) . 
Id. at 527-28. This basic principle was expressly reaffirmed in 
State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977). It is therefore 
clear that, although the Legislature has appropriately delegated 
some of its legislative authority — such as its ratemaking power 
— to the Commission, the Legislature could not, even if it 
desired to do so, delegate the power to levy a tax. 
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A tax by any other name is still a tax. It has been defined 
as "the enforced contribution of persons and property levied by 
the authority of the state." Arizona Department of Revenue v. 
Transamerica Title, 604 P.2d 1128, 1131 (Ariz. 1979). When care-
fully analyzed, the Lifeline pooling arrangement is clearly a tax 
upon Mountain Bell and its customers. Through its Rules, the 
Commission forced Mountain Bell to raise its rates to provide 
revenue with which to subsidize local exchange service for low 
income families who are not Mountain Bell's customers. Under the 
logic of Mountain States Legal Foundation case, supra, the Com-
mission's ratemaking authority could appropriately require 
Mountain Bell non-Lifeline customers to fund lower rates for 
Mountain Bell Lifeline customers.10 However, once the Commission 
required Mountain Bell customers to subsidize Lifeline customers 
in other companies (i.e., once the subsidy flowed beyond the 
boundaries of Mountain Bell's service territory), the Commission 
crossed the boundary between appropriate ratemaking and illegal 
taxation. 
The Contel witness argued for pooling on the ground that 
Lifeline "is a social program for the benefit of society." (R. 
183). In requiring pooling, the Commission has treated the 
program in just the way Mr. Carrier characterized it. If the 
10. Mountain Bell was an active supporter of Lifeline and took 
the position that if funded on a company-specific basis, it 
was a legitimate exercise of the Commission's ratemaking 
power. 
program is a social program, then it should be funded by the 
Legislature using state tax revenues rather than through a taxing 
mechanism illegally approved by an administrative agency.H 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court should set aside 
those portions of the Lifeline Rules and Orders that require the 
pooling arrangement for the Lifeline program. 
DATED this 31st day of July, 1987* 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
Te^ 3 D. Smith, Attorney 
Floyd A. Jensen, Attorney 
11. It is curious'that under the Rule finally adopted, the local 
access surcharges are imposed only on "non-lifeline customers 
of the local exchange carriers offering Lifeline telephone 
service." (R. 634). Yet in its denial of Mountain Bell's 
requests for rehearing, the Commission noted that it "would 
be unjust and unreasonable to impose the Lifeline program on 
a Company specific basis." (R. 675). Thus, while charac-
terizing lifeline as being "in the best interests of all 
telephone customers in Utah" (R. 647), the Commission only 
requires those non-Lifeline customers in participating compa-
nies to fund the program. The reason surcharges were not 
imposed upon customers in non-participating companies is 
fairly obvious. To do so would clearly go beyond the Commis-
sion's ratemaking power into the area of illegal taxation. 
Yet there is no practical or legal distinction between forc-
ing customers of non-participating companies to fund lifeline 
rates and in requiring Mountain Bell ratepayers to subsidize 
lifeline rates in other companies. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann* § 54-4-1 (1986) 
The commission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise 
and regulate every public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the 
business of every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether 
herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or 
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction; provided, however, 
that the department of transportation shall have jurisdiction over those safety 
functions transferred to it by the Department of Transportation Act. 
U t a h Code Ann . § 5 4 - 4 - 5 ( 1 9 8 6 ) 
Whenever the commission shall find after a hearing, that the rates, fares or 
charges in force over the lines of two or more common carriers between any 
two points in this state are unjust, unreasonable or excessive, or that no 
satisfactory through route or joint rate, fare or charge exists between such 
points, or that public convenience and necessity demand the establishment of 
a through route and joint rate, fare or charge between such points, the com-
mission shall order such common carriers to establish such through route, and 
may establish and fix a joint rate, fare or charge which will be fair, just, 
reasonable and sufficient to be allowed, charged, enforced, demanded and 
collected in the future, and the terms and conditions under which such 
through route shall be operated. The commission may order that freight mov-
ing between such points shall be carried by the different common carriers, 
parties to such through route and joint rate, without being transferred from 
the originating cars. In case the common carriers do not agree between them-
selves upon the division of the joint rates, fares or charges established by the 
commission over such through routes, the commission shall, after hearing, by 
supplementary order establish such division. The commission shall have the 
power to establish and fix through routes and joint rates, fares or charges for 
common carriers, and to fix the division of such joint rates, fares or charges. 
U t a h Code Ann . § 5 4 - 4 - 7 ( 1 9 8 6 ) 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that the rules,, regula-
tions, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public util-
ity, or the methods of manufacture, distribution, transmission, storage or 
supply employed by it, are unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inade-
quate or insufficient, the commission shall determine the just, reasonable, 
safe, proper, adequate or sufficient rules, regulations, practices, equipment, 
appliances, facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished, con-
structed, enforced or employed, and shall fix the same by its order, rule or 
regulation. The commission, after a hearing, shall prescribe rules and regula-
tions for the performance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of 
the character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on proper de-
mand and tender of rates such public utility shall furnish such commodity or 
render such service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such 
rules. 
U t a h Code Ann . § 5 4 - 4 - 1 2 ( 1 9 8 6 ) 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, that a physical con-
nection can reasonably be made between the lines of two or more telephone 
corporations, or two or more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made 
to form a continuous line of communication by the construction and mainte-
nance of suitable connections for the transfer of messages or conversations, 
and that public convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby, or shall 
find that two or more telegraph or telephone corporations have failed to estab-
lish joint rates, tolls or charges for service by or over their said lines and that 
joint rates, tolls or charges ought to be established, the commission may, by 
its order, require that such connection be made, except where the purpose of 
such connection is primarily to secure the transmission of local messages or 
conversations between points within the same city or town, and that conversa-
tions be transmitted and messages transferred over such connections under 
such rules and regulations as the commission may establish and prescribe, 
and that through lines and joint rates, tolls and charges be made and be used, 
observed and be in force in the future. If such telephone or telegraph corpora-
tions do not agree upon the division between themselves of the cost of such 
physical connection or connections, or upon the division of the joint rates, tolls 
or charges established by the commission over such through lines, the com-
mission shall have authority, after a further hearing, to establish such divi-
sion by supplemental order. 
ADDENDUM 2 - PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION RULES AND ORDERS 
EXHIBIT A - LIFELINE RULES Adopted by Utah Public Service 
Commission - December 1, 1986 -
Case No. 85-999-13 
EXHIBIT B - December 17, 1986 Report and Order in Case 
No. 85-999-13 
EXHIBIT C - December 17, 1986 Report and Order in Case 
No. 85-999-13 
EXHIBIT D - January 12, 1987 Order Denying Rehearing in 
Case No. 85-999-13 
EXHIBIT E - February 4, 1987 Order Denying Rehearing 
in Case No. 85-999-13 
EXHIBIT F - February 25, 1986 Report and Order in Case 
Ncs. 85-049-06 and 85-050-01. 
EXHIBIT A 
APPROVE BY COMMISSIONERS 
BRIAN T.STEWART ft' ^ '''('»»> 
L I F E L I N E R U L E S BRENT H. CAMERON JtH 
Applicability 
JAMES M. BYRNE feW'* <ft 
(1) Any local exchange carrier whose monthly single-party 
residential local exchange service flat rate (excluding 
mileage or extended area service charges that may be 
included in a carrier's flat rate), or combined access 
line and usage rate equals or exceeds the amount 
allocated for telephone service in the Standard Needs 
Budget of the Utah Department of Social Services times 
the percentage of the Standard Needs Budget funded by 
the Utah State Legislature, as determined at the end of 
the legislative session, shall establish a lifeline 
telephone service pursuant to the requirements of 
Sections II through V (i.e. for 1986, $18.00 X 
52.5% = $9.45). 
(2) Any local exchange carrier that provides single-party 
residential local exchange service at a monthly rate 
less than that required above, may establish a lifeline 
telephone service pursuant to the requirements of 
Sections II through V, upon making application and 
receiving approval from the Public Service Commission. 
Eligibility Requirements 
(1) The local exchange carrier shall provide lifeline 
telephone service to any applicant that self-certifies, 
that they are currently eligible (though it is not 
necessary that they be participating) for public 
assistance under one of the following programs: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children; 
(b) Emergency Work Program; 
(c) Food Stamps; 
(d) General Assistance; 
(e) Home Energy Assistance Target Program; 
(f) Medical Assistance; 
(g) Refugee Assistance; or 
(h) Supplemental Security Income. 
(2) The term "applicant" as used in Paragraph (1) refers to 
a head of household or person in whose name the prop-
erty or rental agreement resides. 
(3) Self-certification will be upon a form supplied by the 
local exchange carrier or the Department of Social 
Services which contains the following: 
(a) applicant's name, current telephone number, and 
social security number; 
(b) a request for lifeline service; 
(c) an affirmative statement that the applicant 
qualifies for lifeline service; 
(d) a statement as to whether the person is partici-
pating in one of the programs set out in Sec-
tion (1) above or is simply eligible for such 
program; 
(e) a statement that the applicant understands that if 
he/she is later shown to have falsely self-
certified for the lifeline program, that he/she 
will be responsible for the difference between the 
lifeline.rate and the otherwise applicable rate; 
(f) a statement whether this is a reconnect or not; 
and 
(g) signature. 
Verification Procedures 
(1) At least annually, the local exchange carriers offering 
lifeline telephone service shall provide the Utah 
Department of Social Services with computer tapes, 
written list, or personal computer disk, listing their 
lifeline service customers and their social security 
numbers. 
(2) Lifeline telephone customers who do not participate in 
any of the programs listed in Section II, but who are 
qualified to participate in such programs, shall be 
certified by the Utah Department of Social Services as 
being eligible for any of the qualifying programs, and 
shall thereafter be included on a "Lifeline Only" 
verification list maintained by the Department. 
Lifeline customers on such "Lifeline Only" list will be 
required to annually recertify with the Utah Department 
of Social Services to verify their continued eligibil-
ity for lifeline telephone serv:r ^ , 
(3) Any lifeline telephone service customer that fails to 
appear on the Utah Department of Social Service's 
listing of public assistance program participants, or 
"Lifeline Only" list, will become ineligible for the 
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lifeline telephone rate. The local exchange carrier 
shall notify such customer that such customer is now 
ineligible and is no longer entitled to the lifeline 
telephone service rate. 
(4) Any subscriber denied lifeline telephone service under 
Paragraph (3) above shall be entitled to resubscribe to 
lifeline service only after the local exchange carrier 
providing telephone service to such subscriber has 
received confirmation from the Utah Department of 
Social Services that the discontinued lifeline tele-
phone service subscriber is currently a participant in 
a state public assistance program, or is qualified to 
participate in such programs. 
(5) Any lifeline telephone service customer who does not 
qualify and has falsely self-certified and participated 
in the lifeline program will be responsible for the 
difference between the lifeline rate and the otherwise 
applicable rate for the length of time the customer 
subscribed to lifeline telephone service for which the 
customer was not eligible. The local exchange carrier 
may, at its option, choose to backbill the customer for 
such amount. 
IV. Lifeline Telephone Service Features 
The lifeline telephone program shall apply to any 
residence class or grade of service provided by local exchange 
carriers in Utah. Local exchange carriers shall provide the 
following features in a lifeline telephone service, to eligible 
subscribers: 
(1) Those who are eligible for lifeline telephone service 
shall pay a rate for monthly basic local service which 
is equal to: 
(a) the amount allocated for telephone service in the 
Standard Needs Budget of the Utah Department of 
Social Services times the percentage of the 
Standard Needs Budget funded by the Utah State 
Legislature, as determined at the end of the 
legislative session, shall establish a lifeline 
telephone service pursuant to the requirements of 
Sections II through V (i.e. for 1986, $18.00 X 
52.5% = $9.45) , plus 
(b) any Extended Area Service (EAS) charges. 
(2) Customer security deposit requirements will be waived 
for lifeline telephone service subscribers unless such 
subscriber has had a prior credit problem with, or has 
an outstanding bill with any local exchange carrier. 
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(3) Lifeline telephone service subscribers will receive a 
fifty (50) per cent reduction in the line connection or 
reconnection charge, but only once during any twelve 
(12) month period. The subscriber will be entitled to 
pay the line connection or reconnection charge in no 
more than three monthly installments. 
(4) Lifeline telephone service subscribers will receive a 
waiver of the nonrecurring service charge for changing 
the type of local exchange usage service to lifeline 
service, or changing from flat rate service to message 
rate service, or vice versa, but only once during any 
twelve (12) month period. 
(5) Lifeline telephone service will be subject to the 
following restrictions: 
(a) Applicants must be head of household or person in 
whose name the property or rental agreement 
resides. 
(b) Lifeline telephone service will only be provided 
to the applicant's principle residence. 
(c) A-lifeline telephone service subscriber will only 
be allowed to subscribe to a single residential 
access line. 
V. Reporting Requirements 
Local exchange carriers shall file a semi-annual 
report, by January 31 and July 31, on their lifeline telephone 
service program. Companies with less than 5,000 access lines 
shall only file a report annually by January 31. This report 
shall include the following information: 
(1) administrative costs associated with the lifeline 
telephone service* program; 
(2) number of new and total lifeline telephone service 
subscribers; 
(3) number of lifeline telephone service subscribers that 
are new local exchange service subscribers; 
(4) number of lifeline telephone service subscribers that 
are reconnecting local exchange service; 
(5) number of lifeline telephone service subscribers by 
exchange area; and 
(6) number of lifeline telephone service subscribers by 
type of local exchange usage service rate. 
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Funding of Lifeline 
(1) Eighty percent (80%) of the total cost of providing 
lifeline telephone service statewide, including the 
administrative costs of the local exchange carriers, 
shall be funded from a surcharge imposed upon the 
non-lifeline customers of the local exchange carriers 
offering lifeline telephone service. 
(2) Twenty percent (20%) of the total cost of providing 
lifeline telephone service statewide, including the 
administrative costs of the Public Service Commission 
in administering the pool discussed in Paragraph (3) 
below and the Utah Department of Social Services, shall 
be funded from a surcharge imposed upon all intrastate 
toll and access services in the State of Utah. Such 
surcharge shall be pooled and distributed as set out in 
Paragraph (3). 
(3) The Public Service Commission shall be the administra-
tor of the lifeline pool referred to in Paragraph (2) 
with the following duties: 
(a) verifying the costs of providing lifeline tele-
phone service in the State of Utah; 
(b) calculating the surcharge on intrastate toll and 
access services sufficient to fund twenty percent 
(20%) of the cost of providing lifeline telephone 
services, including the administrative costs of 
the Public Service Commission and the Utah Depart-
ment of Social Services, as set out in Section 4 
below; and 
(c) distributing to each local exchange carrier 
offering lifeline telephone service a share of 
such pool so as to equalize statewide the amount 
of the local service surcharge paid by customers 
of such carriers to fund lifeline telephone 
service. 
(4) (a) The Public Service Commission shall hold a hearing 
for the purpose of establishing two statewide 
surcharge rates which it deems reasonable to 
provide for the funding of lifeline telephone 
service. 
(b) One rate will fund eighty percent (80%) of the 
costs of providing lifeline telephone service, 
including the administrative costs of the local 
exchange carriers, and will be imposed upon the 
non-lifeline customers of the local exchange 
carriers offering lifeline telephone service. 
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(c) The second rate will fund twenty percent (20%) of 
the costs of providing lifeline telephone service, 
including the administrative costs of the Public 
Service Commission in administrating the refer-
enced pool and the Utah Department of Social 
Services, and will be imposed upon all intrastate 
toll and access services. 
(d) The Public Service Commission shall review such 
surcharges annually, or more often upon petition 
by the Division of Public Utilities or any tele-
phone company whose customers are paying the 
surcharge. 
(5) Thirty (30) days following approval of the surcharges 
referred to in Section 4 above, the lifeline telephone 
service of the local exchange carriers required to 
offer such service shall go into effect. 
EXHIBIT B 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Rulemaking 
for the Establishment of Tele-
phone Lifeline Rates for All 
Regulated Local Exchange Car-
riers in the State of Utah 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Appearances: 
Ted Smith 
John W. Horsley 
James J. Cassity 
Gary B. Witt 
Brian W. Burnett, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Bernard M. Tanner, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Bruce Plenk 
ISSUED: December 17, 1986 
For Mountain Bell 
" Continental Telephone 
Company 
H
 Utah Independent 
Telephone Association 
H
 AT&T Communication 
" Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State of Utah 
w
 Committee of Consumer 
Services 
Salt Lake Community 
Action Program and Utah 
Issues 
By the Commission: 
This matter came to hearing before the Commission on 
December 1, 1986 after a continuance was granted to allow the 
parties to reach agreement on the issues of the operation of the 
lifeline pool and the amount of surcharges for lifeline telephone 
service in the state of Utah. The parties subsequently presented 
a stipulation on all issues. 
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The Commission, having received a "Proposed Settlement 
Stipulation" dated December 1, 1986 from all parties in this 
matter and being fully advised in the premises, now makes this 
report containing the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and the Order based thereon. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates, 
data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost 
projections for lifeline telephone service provided by: (a) 
Beehive Telephone Company; (b) Contel; and (c) Mountain Bell; as 
presented in Attachments 1 thru 3 of the Stipulation. 
2. All parties agree that the local exchange carriers 
required to provide lifeline telephone service shall file tariff 
revisions within twenty days of the date of the Commission's 
order in this matter to implement a lifeline telephone service 
surcharge rate at $0.18 per access line (trunk) for non-lifeline 
subscribers. 
3. All parties agree with the assumptions, estimates, 
data and calculations used to develop the 1987 annualized cost 
projections for (a) the Commission's administration of the 
lifeline telephone service surcharge revenue pool and the Utah 
Department of Social Service's administration of the lifeline 
telephone service eligibility and verification procedures; (b) 
the lifeline telephone service revenue requirement that should be 
recovered from the surcharges on intra-LATA toll services and on 
intra-LATA and inter-LATA switched access services (pursuant to 
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the Commission's Rule, 20 percent of Section 2 (a)); and (c) the 
surcharge rate percentage for subscribers of intra-LATA toll 
services and for intra-LATA and inter-LATA switched access 
services as presented in Attachment 4 of the Stipulation. 
4. All parties agree that all local exchange and 
intrastate interexchange carriers regulated by the Commission 
shall be required to file tariff revisions within twenty days of 
the date of the Commission's order in this matter to implement 
lifeline telephone service surcharge rates based on: (a) 0.65 
percent of the subscriber's monthly bill for intrastate intra-
LATA and inter-LATA message telecommunications (and optional 
toll) services (MTS) and wide-area telecommunications service 
(WATS); and (b) 1.88 percent of the monthly bill for intrastate 
intra-LATA and inter-LATA switched access services provided to 
resale carriers (Defined, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 
54-2-1 (30), as "any person which provides, on a resale basis, 
any telephone or telecommunication service which is purchased 
from a telephone corporation."). 
5. All parties agree that six months after the imple-
mentation date for the lifeline telephone service and the sur-
charge rates, and every six months thereafter, the Commission 
shall conduct a proceeding to: 
(a) Review the local exchange carriers' semi-annual life-
line telephone service reports, filed pursuant to the 
Commission's rule; 
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(b) Review the amount of surcharge revenues collected from 
non-lifeline local exchange service, MTS, WATS and 
access service subscribers during the preceding six 
months; 
(c) Review requests by local exchange carriers providing 
lifeline telephone service for payments from the 
surcharge revenue poolf as presented in Attachment 5 of 
the Stipulation; 
(d) Review requests by the Commission and by the Utah 
Department of Social Services for payments from the 
surcharge revenue pool to cover their administrative 
costs associated with the lifeline telephone service 
program? 
(e) Receive surcharge revenue payments from interexchange 
carriers regulated by the Commission and from local 
exchange carriers that do not provide lifeline tele-
phone service, pursuant to the Commission's rule, or 
which collect surcharge revenues in excess of their 
lifeline telephone service revenue requirement (see 
Attachment 5 of the Stipulation); 
(f) Review the local exchange carriers1 projections of 
lifeline telephone service subscribers, revenue re-
quirements and surcharge revenues for the next six 
months. 
(g) Review actions by the State Legislature to increase or 
decrease the funded portion of the Standard Needs 
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Budget of the Utah Department of Social Services 
attributable for telephone service; 
(h) Consider revisions in the level of the lifeline tele-
phone service rate or the surcharge rates. 
6. The Division agrees that it shall audit and review 
all filings by the local exchange carriers in the lifeline 
service summary review proceeding for accuracy and reasonable-
ness. 
7. All parties agree with the cost studies used by 
local exchange carriers to estimate their administrative and 
installation costs for lifeline telephone service. Such cost 
studies shall be furnished to the Commission thirty days prior to 
the first summary review proceeding and every two years thereaf-
ter. 
8# All parties agree that any revisions in the local 
exchange carriers1 rates for residential local exchange services, 
MTS, WATS or switched access services which would affect their 
lifeline telephone service revenue requirements or surcharge 
revenues shall be reviewed in the next lifeline service review 
proceeding. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The adoption of this Stipulation by the Commission 
will be in the best interest of the public and will benefit the 
State of Utah. 
000640 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
- 6 -
2. The Commission has the authority to approve a 
stipulation in any proceeding before it. Section 54-7-1, Utah 
Code readst 
"Information resolution, by agreement of the 
parties, of matters before the commission 
shall be encouraged. These agreements shall 
be subject to the approval of the commission 
and the commission shall give due regard to 
the interests of the public and other affect-
ed persons before issuing orders approving 
any agreement*" 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Stipu-
lation presented to the Commission be and is hereby approved and 
adopted by the Commission and that the bench order is hereby 
affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That all local exchange carriers 
and interexchange carriers regulated by this Commission file 
tariffs in twenty days (20) as agreed to in the Stipulation. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the surcharge rates for the 
support of lifeline telephone service by $0.18 per month per 
access line (trunk), 0.65 percent of billed revenue of toll and 
wide area telephone service, intra and inter LATA, and 1.88 
percent of intrastate access services billed revenue for 
non-regulated interexchange carriers. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That lifeline service shall 
begin on January 1, 1^87, and be subject to a review in totality 
in approximately one year from that date. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of Decem-
ber, 1986, 
dfai _. fast / ( £/*.<*//-
Brian T/. Stewart A Chairman 
( 
— = - = » — \ -H * * " . " 
Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner 
< ^ 2 > * ~ i ^ > ^ 
Jam^ M. Byrne, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Stephen'C. Hewlett 
Commission Secretary 
000642 
EXHIBIT C 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Rulemaking ) 
for the Establishment of Tele- ) 
phone Lifeline Rates for All ) 
Regulated Local Exchange Car- ) 
riers in the State of Utah ) 
CASE NO. 85-999-13 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Appearances: 
Ted Smith 
John W. Horsley 
James J. Cassity 
Gary B. Witt 
Brian W. Burnett, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Bernard M. Tanner, 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
Bruce Plenk 
ISSUED: December 17, 1986 
For Mountain Bell 
* Continental Telephone 
Company 
n
 Utah Independent 
Telephone Association 
M
 AT&T Communication 
" Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State of Utah 
" Committee of Consumer 
Services 
Salt Lake Community 
Action Program and Utah 
Issues 
By the Commission: 
On June 20, 1985, the Commission issued an order 
instituting rulemaking proceedings for the establishment of 
telephone lifeline rates. Rulemaking was instituted in response 
to a Division of Public Utilities (the "Division") memorandum 
received by the Commission on April 29, 1985. The memorandum 
indicated that on June 1, 1985 the Federal Communication 
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Commission (the "FCC") would impose a one dollar (§1.00) charge 
upon all residential customer access lines. The charge was to be 
increased to two dollars ($2.00) on June 1, 1986. 
The memorandum further stated that the FCC had adopted 
by its order of December 27, 1985 the Federal-State Joint Board's 
recommendation that the FCC implement federal lifeline assistance 
measures to assist low-income households in securing telephone 
service. The order provides for a waiver of the federal residen-
tial customer access charge upon condition that the state adopt a 
qualifying plan for local lifeline assistance. To qualify the 
local plan must satisfy the following criteria: 
1. The End User Common Line Charge (also 
referred to as the subscriber line charge or 
CALC) for residential subscribers shall be 
reduced to the extent the state assistance 
equals or exceeds the residential End User 
Common Line Charge. 
2. In order to qualify for this waiver, the 
subscriber must be eligible for and receive 
assistance or benefits provided pursuant to a 
narrowly targeted state lifeline assistance 
plan requiring verification of eligibility, 
implemented by the state or the loccil tele-
phone company. 
3. The state assistance shall include 
reduced rates for local telephone service, 
service connection charges and customer 
deposits, except that benefits or assistance 
for connection charges and deposit require-
ments may only be counted once annually. 
Such benefits must be for a single telephone 
line, the household's principal residence. 
The Division's memorandum further states: 
"...that the House and Senate sponsors of 
federal legislation which mandate state 
lifeline service have delayed action on their 
bills until after they have evaluated the 
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responsiveness of the FCC and State Com-
missions to their concerns." 
On July 2, 1985, a prehearing conference was held 
before the Commission. At the conference, several' parties 
suggested issues to be discussed in the evidentiary portion of 
the proceeding, and the schedule was established for filing of 
legal briefs, testimony and a date for hearing. 
On September 5, 1985, the Commission issued a Prehear-
ing Order and Notice of Hearing. In that Order, the Commission 
asked that the parties address several issues, one of which was 
whether or not the Commission had authority to establish lifeline 
rates. The Commission further ordered hearings to be held 
December 16, 1985. 
The Commission heard arguments on the issue of the 
Commission's authority to set lifeline rates on December 16, 
1985. All parties agreed that the Commission was vested with 
sufficient authority to order a lifeline telephone service rate. 
Based upon the legal arguments of the parties, the 
Commission issued a declaratory order on January 3, 1986, which 
concluded that the Commission had authority to construct a 
lifeline telephone service for low-income subscribers. 
On February 18, 1986, the Commission held hearings on 
the design of rates and the classification of the ratepayer who 
would qualify to obtain the lower "lifeline'1 rate. Testimony was 
presented by the parties, as well as by public witnesses on 
Public Witness Day, February 20, 1986. The parties1 witnesses 
were as follows: 
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The Division of Public Utilities presented testimony 
through Gary B. Hinton. Mountain Bell presented testimony 
through Orville K. Unruh. Theodore J. Carrier presented 
testimony for Continental Telephone Company, Perry A. Arana and 
Raymond A. Hendershot were witnesses for the Utah Independent 
Telephone Association. Diane Roth presented testimony for AT&T 
Communications. Joe Duke-Rosati was the witness for Salt Lake 
Community Action Program. R. Phil Bullock and Timothy Funk 
testified for the Committee of Consumer Services. 
Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence 
adduced in this matter, the Commission will make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Nationally, the telephone penetration rate is about 
90.3 percent (90.3%) for all classes of customers. For low-
income persons (who are defined hereinafter by reference to 
eligibility for public welfare assistance programs) the pene-
tration rate is 72 percent (72%) , a differential of almost 20 
percent (20%) . In the Mountain Bell service area and in Utah 
specifically, the overall subscriber rate for telephone service 
is approximately ninety-five percent (95%). Among low-income 
households the rate is about 20 percent (20%) less. Among 
apartment dwellers in Mountain Bell's service area, 71 percent 
(71%) of those who have terminated telephone service report that 
they could no longer afford the service and as of April, 1984, 
only 63.2 percent (63.2%) of participants in the Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children had telephone service. 
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2. Beyond that, it appears that future customer 
drop-off will be significant among low-income subscribers, since 
low-income households have fewer discretionary funds and are at 
greater risk of losing phone service as basic telephone rates 
increase. 
3. The Commission has long supported the policy of 
universal service, by which is meant the offering of affordable 
telephone service to as many of the citizens of the State as 
possible. This policy is likewise endorsed and supported by the 
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission. 
4. Universal service offers substantial benefits to 
all customers. The promotion of universal service means more 
subscribers in the telephone network and greater communications 
access to all. Greater access enhances business and quality of 
life. Greater access results in greater efficiency in the 
delivery of state social services programs and, thus, better use 
of tax dollars. Maintaining subscribers in the network avoids 
the stranding of capital facilities. 
5. A lifeline rate will promote universal service and, 
thereby, be in the best interests of all telephone customers in 
the State, both local and toll. We conclude that there are sound 
economic reasons for establishing a distinct class of low-income 
residence customers with a lower service rate level than the 
remaining body of residence customers. 
6. In its rules, the Commission requires that tele-
phone companies, whose basic service rates exceed the amount 
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allocated for telephone service in the Standard Needs Budget set 
by the State Legislature for the Department of Social Service, 
establish a lifeline telephone service. The amount allocated in 
the Standard Need^ Budget at the end of the last legislative 
session was $9.45. Under the lifeline rules, the recipient of a 
lifeline rate must pay the funded portion of the Standard Needs 
Budget plus Extended Area Services (EAS) charges. We conclude 
that such an approach is fair and reasonable in that it ties the 
amount of rate relief given to lifeline recipients to an objec-
tive figure developed by the State Legislature and assures that 
lifeline recipients will not receive more in support for tele-
phone service through lifeline rates and the Standard Needs 
Budget than the rate for service. 
7. The rules provide that any person who is currently 
eligible for one or more of the following state assistance 
programs shall be eligible for the lifeline rate: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children; 
(b) Emergency Work Program; 
(c) Food Stamps; 
(d) General Assistance; 
(e) Home Energy Assistance Target Program; 
(f) Medical Assistance; 
(g) Refugee Assistance; or 
(h) Supplemental Security Income 
8. The foregoing programs provide a reasonable basis 
for identifying those person in the state who, because of their 
nnnfMs 
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income limitations, do not have telephone service or who may be 
compelled to disconnect their telephone service as rates for 
basic service increase. Tying lifeline service to these programs 
recognizes and adopts the Legislature's conclusions about which 
persons are most in need of public assistance. By adopting these 
programs as eligibility criteria, we also ensure that existing 
mechanisms for determining eligibility are utilized, which 
mechanisms provide a reasonable and cost-effective means of 
verifying continued eligibility for lifeline service. On bal-
ance, our finding that these categories are fair and reasonable 
takes advantage of prior legislative findings that program 
recipients are truly in need of assistance while at the same time 
facilitating reasonable qualifications and verification proce-
dures. 
9. We conclude that the rules for Lifeline Telephone 
Service will address the needs of the low-income residential 
subscribers. 
10. The Commission has the authority to adopt rules 
pertaining to lifeline telephone service pursuant to Section 
54-4-1, 54-4-4(2), 54-4-7 and particularly 54-3-1, Utah Code. 
The latter section reads in pertinent part: 
"The scope of definition "just and reason-
able" may include, but shall not be limited 
to, the cost of providing service to each 
category of customer, economic impact of 
charges on each category of customer, and on 
the well-being of the State of Utah;" (empha-
sis added) 
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About Section 54-3-1, Utah Code, as cited above, the 
Supreme Court in Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public 
Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), stated: 
"The 19 77 amendments to Section 54-3-1, by 
permitting consideration of the economic 
impact of a rate on each category of custom-
ers , gave legislative approval, in the form 
of binding law, to considerations which may 
relate, directly or indirectly, to "social 
problems." (emphasis added) 
It is evident that the Court has concluded that the 
Commission has authority to enact a lifeline telephone rate to 
meet the needs of a distinct class of low-income residential 
customers under existing law. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That: 
1. The rules for Lifeline Telephone Service heretofore 
adopted and made effective December 1, 1986 as filed with the 
State Archivist, are hereby affirmed and implemented to be 
effective January 1, 1987. 
2. The companion order issued this date in this same 
docket by which the Commission has adopted a stipulation of the 
parties on the issues of the operation of the lifeline pool and 
the amount of the surcharges for lifeline telephone service in 
the State of Utah is hereby affirmed and implemented to take 
effect January 1, 1987. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of Decem-
ber, 1986. 
Br^an T.j Stewart I Chairman 
\')1A£ a* *>(-*('- <• 
B r e n t H. Camferon, Commissxoner 
A t t e s t : 
Stephen1 C. Hewlett 
Commission Secretary 
_^ v A y$$ uxs 
James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
EXHIBIT D 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Rulemaking ) 
of the Establishment of Tele- ) CASE NO. 85-999-13 
phone LIFELINE RATES for all ) 
Regulated Local Exchange Car- ) ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
riers in the State of Utah ) 
ISSUED: January 12, 1987 
By the Commission: 
On December 22, 1986, the Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) filed a Petition for Review or 
Rehearing of Section VI of the Lifeline Rules adopted by the 
Commission on December 1, 1986. Mountain Bell recited in support 
of its Petition that the Commission lacked the statutory and 
constitutional authority to adopt a rule requiring Mountain Bell 
to participate in a pooling arrangement for the funding of 
Lifeline telephone service. Mountain Bell further asserted that 
the Commission had failed to make adequate findings of fact to 
support a rule requiring a pooling arrangement. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the 
following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In our Order of December 17, 1986 we found that we 
had statutory authority to adopt rules pertaining to lifeline 
telephone service pursuant to Section 54-4-1, 54-4-4(2), 54-4-7 
and 54-3-1 Utah Code Ann. (See Finding #10 page 7 Commission 
Order dated December 7, 1986). In a companion Order of December 
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17, 1986, we accepted a proposed stipulation which established 
the mechanism for the funding of the program which Mountain Bell 
now disputes . In that Order we did not rule on the issue of 
whether we had jurisdiction to require Mountain Bell and the 
other independent exchange carriers to participate in a pooling 
arrangement for the funding of Lifeline telephone service because 
we believed that all parties to the stipulation were in agreement 
that pooling was the only presently workable mechanism to fund 
the Lifeline program. Aside from the stipulation, we do believe 
that there is sufficient statutory authority for us to require 
pooling. Section 54-4-5 Utah Code Ann, specifically states that 
the Commission "shall have the power to establish and fix through 
routes and joint rates, fares or charges for common carriers, and 
to fix the division of such joint rates, fares or charges." 
Section 54-4-7 Utah Code Ann, states that the Commission after 
hearing "shall prescribe rules and regulations for the Perfor-
mance of any service or the furnishing of any commodity of the 
character furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on 
proper demand and tender of rates such public utility shall 
furnish such commodity or render such service within the time and 
upon the conditions proviced in such rules." Based upon the 
statutory authority provided in Sections 54-4-5 and 54-4-7 Utah 
Code Ann. we conclude that we have the statutory authority to 
require the parties to participate in a pooling arrangement for 
the funding of the Lifeline program. 
2. Based upon the testimony and evidence presented to 
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us in our rulemaking hearing on this matter, we concluded that it 
would be unjust and unreasonable to impose the Lifeline program 
on a company specific basis as Mountain Bell proposed because the 
Independent Local Exchange Carriers (Independents) would be 
forced to so dramatically increase the rates charged to their 
non-lifeline subscribers as to make the program unworkable. We 
concluded that there was no other alternative mechanism to fund 
the Lifeline program than through the pooling of funds. 
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing 
therefore, the Commission will make the following 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Mountain 
Bell's Petition for Review and Rehearing of Section VI of the 
Lifeline Rules is hereby denied. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 12th day of 
January, 1987. 
Attest: 
Stephen C. Hewlett 
Commission Secretary 
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EXHIBIT E 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Rulemaking ) 
of the Establishment of Tele- ) CASE NO, 85-999-13 
phone LIFELINE RATES for all ) 
Regulated Local Exchange Car- ) ORDER DENYING REHEARING 
riers in the State of Utah. ) 
ISSUED: February 4, 1987 
By the Commission: 
On January 6, 1986, the Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) filed a Petition for Review and 
Rehearing of the companion orders entered by the Commission on 
December 17, 1986, which stated that the Commission lacked the 
statutory and constitutional authority to adopt a rule requiring 
Mountain Bell to participate in a pooling arrangement for the 
funding of Lifeline telephone service and that the Commission 
failed to make adequate findings of fact to support a rule 
requiring pooling arrangement. 
Mountain Bell previously filed an Application for 
Review and Rehearing on December 19, 1986 of the Rules adopted by 
the Commission on December 1, 1986 which was subsequently denied 
by the Commission on December 1, 1986 which was subsequently 
denied by the Commission. See Order Denying Rehearing dated 
January 12, 1987. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Commission will make the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In our Order of December 17, 1986, we found that we 
had statutory authority to adopt rules pertaining to Lifeline 
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telephone service pursuant to Section 54-4-1, 54-4-4(2), 54-4-7, 
and 54-3-1 Utah Code Ann, (See Finding #10, page 7, Commission 
Order dated December 17, 1986). In a companion Order of December 
17, 1986, we accepted a Proposed Stipulation which established 
the mechanism for the funding of the program which Mountain Bell 
now disputes. In that Order we did not rule on the issue of 
whether we had jurisdiction to require Mountain Bell and the 
other independent exchange carriers (Independents) to participate 
in a pooling arrangement for the funding of the Lifeline tele-
phone service because we believed that all parties to the Stipu-
lation were in agreement that pooling was the only presently 
workable mechanism to fund the Lifeline program. Aside from the 
Stipulation, we do believe that there is sufficient statutory 
authority for us to require pooling. Section 54-4-5 Utah Code 
Ann, specifically states that the Commission "shall have the 
power to establish and fix through routes and joint rates, fares 
or charges for common carriers, and to fix the division of such 
joint rates, fares or charges." Section 54-4-7 Utah Code Ann, 
states that the Commission after hearing "shall prescribe rules 
and regulations for the performance of any service or the fur-
nishing of any commodity of the character furnished or supplied 
by any public utility, and on proper demand and tender of rates 
such public utility shall furnish such commodity or render such 
service within the time and upon the conditions provided in such 
rules." Based upon the statutory authority provided in Sections 
54-4-5 and 54-4-7 Utah Code Ann., we conclude that we have the 
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statutory authority to require the parties to participate in a 
pooling arrangement for the funding of the Lifeline program. 
2. According to the testimony of Theodore J. Carrier 
witness for Continental Telephone (Contel), Contel customers 
would have to pay a substantially higher rate than Mountain Bell 
customers to fund Lifeline service. (See transcript page 191) . 
Gary Hinton, witness for the Division, also testified that the 
Independents, in particular Navajo Communications, have a higher 
percentage of subscribers who qualify for the Lifeline service, 
leaving a lessor percentage of non-lifeline ratepayers to pay for 
the program at substantially higher rates. Based upon that 
testimony and other evidence presented to us in our rulemaking 
hearing on this matter, we concluded that it would be unjust and 
unreasonable to impose the Lifeline program on a company-specific 
basis as Mountain Bell proposed, because the Independents would 
be forced to so dramatically increase the rates charged to their 
non-lifeline subscribers as to make the program unworkable. We 
concluded that there was no other alternative mechanism to fund 
the Lifeline program than through the pooling of funds. 
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing 
therefore, the Commission will make the following: 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Mountain 
Bell's Petition for Review and Rehearing of the companion orders 
to the Lifeline Rules is hereby denied. 
OOOGSfi 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 4th day of Febru-
ary, 1987. 
Attest; 
Stephen C. Hewlett 
Commission Secretary 
j * . / 
/2~ 
. -/- \ £ *» T* f - i/. m m i«V — 
B r i ^ n T. I S t e w a r t , iCjiairman 
__ jjlJt^ 
B r e n t H. Cameron, Commissioner 
CL&rfes M. Byrne , Commissioner 
EXHIBIT F 
FEB 2 6 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Peti t ion of 
MOUNTAIN BELL for a D e t e r -
mination of Appropr i a t e Division 
of Costs and Revenues be tween 
Mountain Bell and Various 
I n d e p e n d e n t Companies re la t ing 
to the Joint Provision of 
IntraLATA Toll S e r v i c e s . 
In the Matter of the Peti t ion 
of NAVAJO COMMUNICATIONS 
COMPANY for the Determina-
tion of a J u s t and Reasonable 
Division of Pvevenues Between 
Navajo Communications Company, 
I n c . and the Mountain S ta tes 
Telephone and Te leg raph 
Company in Connection with 
the Provision of the I n t r a -
LATA Toll Services in Utah . 
CASE NO. 85-049-06 
PwEPORT ANT CR.DER 
CASE NO. 35-050-01 
ISSUED: F e b r u a r y 25, 1936 
By the Commission: 
This mat te r was in i t ia ted on J u n e 3 , 1935 by the filing of a 
Peti t ion by Navajo Communications Company, I n c . 'Navajo^ r e q u e s t i n g 
t ha t the Commission examine i s sues re la t ing to toll se t t l ements between 
Navajo and the Mountain S ta tes Te lephone and Te l eg raph Company 
Ofountain BelP . The mat ter ult imately was consolidated with Case No. 
85-049-06 and came to hea r ing on September 11 , 1Q35. Navaio p r e s e n t e d 
test imony b y Mr. Jackie N. D u k e s . Mountain Bell p r e s e n t e d tes t imony 
by Mr. Eugene A. Enebo . Briefs were s u b s e q u e n t l y filed b y Navajo, 
Mountain Bell and the Division of Public Util i t ies. 
CAST: NOS. 85-04Q-06 and 35-050-01 
- ^ -
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both Navajo and Mountain Bell are certificated telephone 
public utilities in the state of Utah, 
2. Mavajo has three exchanges in Utah, all located in the 
southeastern part of the s tate , 
3. Prior to the divesti ture of the Bell System on Tanuary 1, 
1934, intrastate long-distance calls between Mountain Bell exchanges and 
Navaio exchanges were switched through Albuquerque, New Mexico; an 
actual direct physical connection existed between Navajo and Mountain 
Bell. 
4. At divest i ture , the physical connection between Mountain 
Bell and Navajo with regard to long-distance service within the state of 
Utah ceased. 
5. Since divest i ture, calls from a Navajo exchange in Utah to 
a Mountain BeP exchange in Utah have been carried by AT&TM Compen-
sation for the joint provision of such calls ( i . e . those between Navajo 
and Mountain Bell exchanges^ are currently subject to the intrastate 
access charge tariffs recently approved by this Commission in Case No. 
83-999-11. 
6. The issue in this proceeding is whether Mountain Bell has 
an obligation to continue toll settlements with regard to Navajo's toll 
traffic between its three exchanges in the state of Utah. 
7. Toll traffic between those three exchanges is t ransported 
and switched exclusively by Mavajo. No Mountain 3ell facilities are 
involved in any manner whatsoever. 
8. In 1^84, Navaio requested that Judge Greene classify 
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Navajo's Utah and Arizona exchanges as non-associated territories within 
each s ta te . This action was taken by Navajo in order to prevent the 
loss of $1.5 million in annual revenues . 
9. On September 2, 1984, Judge Greene ruled that all Navajo 
exchanges in Utah and Arizona "are to be considered separate indepen-
dent non-associated territories within each state. ' ' 
10. In December 1984, Mountain Bell informed Navajo that toll 
settlements for Navajo's Utah intrastate traffic would chse in 1985. 
11. On March 26, 1985 Mountain 3ell notified Navajo that 
settlements would end on June 30, 1985. Thereafter, Mountain ?jell 
agreed to extend settlements until October 15, 1985. 
12. During the hearings in this matter, Mountain Bell agreed 
to extend settlements to January 1, 1986. 
CONCT.U5IQN5 OF LAuf 
\. In its petition and Brief, Navajo cited several Utah s tat-
utes that it argues gives the Commission the jurisdictional power to 
order Mountain Bell to continue toll settlements with >V/ajc, This 
Commission has settlements with Navajo. This Commission has tradition-
ally taken a broad view of its jurisdiction. However, the Commission, as 
a creature o* s ta tute , cannot fail to review and *ollow specific statutory 
provisions relating to a specific set of facts. 
?. The statutory provisions cited by vavajo (e. g, Utah Code 
Ann. ^ 5 4 - 3 - 7 , 54-3-3, 54-4-1, 54-4-2, 54-4-4, and 5 4 - 4 - ^ do indeed 
grant this Commission broad powers to regulate the activities o* public 
utilities operating in this s ta te . 
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3. However, Navaio neither cited nor discussed Utah Code 
Ann. §54-4-12, the specific section o* the Utah statutes that deals with 
intrastate toll settlements. Section 54-4-12 s ta tes : 
Whenever the commission shall find, after a hearing, 
that a physical connection can reasonably be made between 
the lines of two or more telephone corporations, or two or 
more telegraph corporations, whose lines can be made to 
form a continuous line of communication by the con-
struction and maintenance of suitable connections for the 
transfer of messages or conversations, and that public 
convenience and necessity will be subserved thereby, or 
shall find that two or more telegraph or telephone corpo-
rations have failed to establish joint ra tes , tolls or charges 
for service by or over their said Unes and that joint 
r a t e s , tolls or charges ought to be established, the com-
mission mav, bv its order , require that such connection be 
made, except where the purpose ot such connection is 
primarily to secure the transmission of local messages or 
conversations between points within the same city or town, 
and that conversations be transmitted and messages t r a n s -
ferred over such connections under such rules and r egu-
lations as the commission may establish and prescr ibe, and 
that through lines and joint r a t e s , tolls and charges be 
made and be used, observed and be in force in the fu-
tu re . If such telephone or telegraph corporations do not 
agree upon the division between themselves of the cost of 
such physical connection or connections, or upon the 
division oi the joint ra tes , tolls or charges established by 
the commission over such through lines, the Commission 
shall have authority after a further hearing, tc establish 
such division by supplemental order . (Emphasis added) 
4. We are thus confronted with several general provisions and 
a statute relating to the particular issue before the Commis-
sion—intrastate toll settlements. The cases decided by the Utah Su-
preme Court that deal with a conflict between a general statutory p ro -
vision and a specific provision make it clear "that express provisions of 
statutes take precedence over general ones.'1 Pacific Intermountain 
Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 316 P . M 54Q 'Utah 1^57\ The 
same principle has been recently reaffirmed in at ]east two other de-
cisions, Perrv v. Pioneer Wholesale SUDOIV Co. , o3L P.?d 214 'Utah 
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1984), Millett v . Clark Cline Corp . , 609 P.2d 934 'Utah 1980). In light 
of these cases, the Commission must be guided by Section 54-4-12 to the 
extent its terms conflict with other, more general, statutory provisions. 
5« Our review of Section 54-4-12 leads us to the conclusion 
that the Commission cannot compel Mountain Bell to continue settlements 
with Navajo with regard to ^avajo's intrastate toll traffic between its 
three Utah exchanges. Section 54-4-12 refers to "physical connection" 
several times. The s ta tute , for examule, gives the Commission the 
power to order a physical connection between two companies if neces-
sary . Obviously, no such physical connection is necessary in order for 
Navajo to provide toll service between its Utah exchanges. The statute 
further states that if companies, which are physically connected, cannot 
agree to the division "of the cost of such physical connections" or of the 
division of revenues from such lines, then the Commission can establish 
such division by order . 
6. In this case, the evidence is undisputed that (1^ no 
physical connection exists and (2) all toll traffic between the Navajo 
exchanges is carried exclusively by Navajo. 
7. It is also clear that Navajo's terr i tory in Utah is the 
functional equivalent of a separate LATA in Utah. Judge Greene's 
recent ruling made it clear that if areas are disassociated from a Bell 
LATA, that a Bell Operating Company fsuch as Mountain Bell) "would be 
forever barred from providing « ervice between the independent terri tory 
and the adjacent LATA." f o u n t a i n Bell Exhibit 5, at page 3) . Thus , 
Mountain Bell is legally precluded from establishing a physical connection 
with Navajo in the state of Utah. 
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8. Based on the foregoing, the Commission concludes that it 
cannot order Mountain Bell to continue settlements and that Navajo's 
Petition, therefore, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be g ran-
ted. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Commission issues the following 
ORDER 
NOV/, THEREFORE, IT IS HERE3Y ORDERED, That: 
1* The Petition of Navajo fails to state a claim for which this 
Commission can grant relief and is therefore dismissed with prejudice. 
2. Mountain Bell has no obligation to continue settlements with 
Navajo in the state of Utah beyond January 1, 1986, 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 25th cay of February, 
1986. 
I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
Is/ 
Is! 
James 
Brian 
M. 
m 
3 y r n e , 
Stewart 
Commissioner 
, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Georgia 3 . Peterson, Secretary 
